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The Philadelphia Stock Exchange:
Adapting

to Survive

in Changing

Markets

Stock
This article analyzes the evolution of the Philadelphia
from
stock
America's
oldest
1950
exchange,
Exchange (PHLX),
through 2000. PHLX was able to compete against the much
larger New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) because it exploited
trading commissions
loopholes created by fixed minimum
to
After
of commissions,
the
the
liberalization
1975.
prior
PHLX competed against the NYSE by offering automated exe
cutions that met the needs of discount brokers. It also moved
early to trade equity options and developed the first exchange
based market for foreign currency options.

Stock Exchange
of the Philadelphia
evolution
(PHLX) during
a compelling
the
second
half
of
twentieth
the
century constitutes
The
reasons.
For
written
about
little
has
been
for
several
one,
very
story
are
and even many financial
economists
the regional stock exchanges,
uncertain
about what they do and why they do it. By focusing on one
I can provide a rich account of its opera
particular regional exchange,
At
tions and business
the same time, since most of the other
strategies.
of the characteristics
of
shared many
surviving
regional
exchanges
a
on
the PHLX, an account of its evolution
the
provides
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of the regional exchanges generally.
In addition, an analy
development
sis of the progressive
of the PHLX necessarily
transformation
entails
of
the
in
structure
the
of
many profound
background
profiles
changes
securities markets
that occurred in the second half of the twentieth cen
case
of the PHLX is in itself a fascinating
tury. Finally, the evolution
of
to
business
and
and
study
strategy
major competitive
adaptation
regulatory shocks.
In examining
this half-century
in the history
runs
three
distinct
The
first
from the
tify
periods.
to
in
the
in
the
order
1950s
begin
capture
postwar
regional stock exchanges and the challenges
they
I
ders away from the New York Stock Exchange.

of the PHLX, I iden
1950s through 1974.1
characteristics
of the
faced in attracting or

end the first period in
1974, because this is the last year that exchanges
could, and did, specify
minimum
commissions
that nonmembers
had to pay in order to trade
on the exchanges.
In addition, during this period, the PHLX only traded
not
the
equities,
options that became
important to it in later years. The
second period begins in 1975 and ends in 1983. This is an era of great
innovation for the PHLX, as it introduced automated
routing and exe
cution of retail equity trades and began to trade equity options, equity
index options,
and foreign-currency
options. The third period runs
from 1984 through 2000. During this era, while the PHLX enjoyed the
into options, it also had to confront
benefits of its earlier diversification
new regulatory and competitive
threats to the successful market niches
it had created.
Before telling the story of the evolution of the PHLX, Iwill explain
a recurring theme in this account. Economic
theory would tend to pre
dict that there would be only one exchange to trade any particular secu
are
in large part because
securities markets
rity or group of securities,
that people buying (or
subject to "network effects."1 This simply means
selling) a security will generally want to go to the market center where
the largest number of others are selling (or buying) the same security.
their chances of receiving the
By following this strategy, they maximize
the
is
best price and completing
transaction quickly. This point, which
attracts
has
often summed up by the phrase "liquidity
impor
liquidity,"
tant implications.
If an exchange,
for example, gains a dominant mar
ket share in trading a particular security, all trading of the security may
In other words, network effects can create
quickly move to that market.
natural
exchange

monopolies
becomes

In determining
for securities
exchanges.
the location for trading a particular security,

which
there is

1
of network efforts in trading systems and factors af
For a clear, nontechnical
discussion
see Larry Harris, Trading
Market Mi
and Exchanges:
among markets,
fecting competition
crostructure for Practitioners
(New York, 2003).
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a "first mover"
The exchange
that first gains a dominant
advantage.
to trade the security,
market
because
it
is
the
first
is
share, perhaps
more likely to become the monopoly
center than later entrants.
Over the course of the half-century
that I examine here, the Phila
to survive, and sometimes
to thrive,
delphia stock exchange managed
while capturing only a relatively minor share of total national trading of
stocks and equity options. If network effects are signif
exchange-listed
one
would
to far
icant,
expect it to have folded as trading migrated
as
market
such
New
the
York
Stock
centers,
(NYSE)
larger
Exchange
for exchange-listed
equities and the Chicago Board Options Exchange
for exchange-traded
options. Why didn't this happen?
In what follows,
I explain how the PHLX was able to compete
much
these
the answer at the
against
larger rivals. But to summarize
a
came
number
of
into
factors
outset,
play, including high communica
tion costs

in the PHLX's earliest years; restrictive membership
and list
on
the
standards
efforts
to
institutions
evade
fixed
trad
NYSE;
ing
by
a
of
differentiation
to
ing commissions;
trading technologies
appeal to
order-flow
particular
and, perhaps,
providers; government
regulations
that allowed them to monopolize
implicit collusion among exchanges
the trading of specific equity option contracts; and the development
of
new products
that were not traded on other exchanges. All these fac
tors have,
overcome
ability

at different times, accounted
for the ability of the PHLX to
the network
effects that would
otherwise
undermine
the
of a small securities exchange
to coexist alongside much
larger

exchanges.2

Before exploring the three distinct eras in the history of the PHLX
outlined above, Iwill set the context for the 1950s by briefly reviewing
the evolution of the PHLX prior to that time.

The Early Years
The Philadelphia
Stock Exchange dates its founding to the 1790 li
of
the
Board of Brokers, making
it the oldest stock
censing
Philadelphia
2
For a theoretical discussion
of sources of competitive
and the implications
for
advantage
see Michael
business
E. Porter, The Competitive
strategies,
(New
Advantage
of Nations
case studies from a variety of countries
to sup
York, 1990). Porter also provides numerous
One can easily apply the theory to competition
port his theory of competitive
advantage.
but the factors emphasized
in the theory should be modified
in
among securities markets,
two ways to fit this industry more closely. First, where Porter
cluster
emphasizes
geographic
in securities markets
it is the network ef
ing that can result from agglomeration
economies,
fects that promote
the clustering of trades within a single market center. Second, competition
within
securities markets
and the structure of those markets
are heavily shaped by govern
ment regulations.
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its founding and the mid-nineteenth
exchange in the country.3 Between
the
traded government
debt
century,
exchange mainly
Philadelphia
and the securities of local banks, insurance companies,
and bridge and
turnpike

companies.4
the New York Stock Exchange was founded about two
Although
the PHLX in trading volume.
after
the
PHLX, it soon surpassed
years
As the legal historians Walter Werner
and Stephen Smith write, "Reli
reveal that reported
able comparisons
for the trading years 1837-1840
was on average 13.9 percent of the vol
in Philadelphia
share volume
ume in New York. . . ."5The prominence
of the NYSE was due to New
commerce
in
York's preeminent
generally. New York, unlike
position
was
to
Great
Lakes
linked
the
region as a result of the
Philadelphia,
of the Erie Canal, and its ports were better positioned
1825 completion
for shipping back and forth to Europe.
share of
Over the course of the nineteenth
century, an increasing
out
carried
transactions
the trading in financial
securities,
especially
or
to
NYSE
the
be
entities, migrated
government
by the largest firms
cause

But relatively high
of the liquidity and depth of that market.
to compete in the
costs enabled the regional exchanges
communication
not
could
first half of the century. Philadelphians
quickly discover the
trading in New York, nor could they quickly trans
prices of securities
costs off
mit trade orders to that city. In other words, communication
to
in
set the tendency for the trading of securities
become concentrated
to
one market center, clearing a space for regional securities exchanges
flourish.
By the 1850s, the United States was actively engaged in developing
a national
the creation of large
facilitated
telegraph network, which
on the NYSE
to
securities
list
their
that sought
national
corporations
were
of
the
attracted by
because
capital in New York
deep pools
they
3Over the
has had a variety of names and office
Stock Exchange
years, the Philadelphia
In
with one exception.
locations. But it has always been located in Center City Philadelphia,
to a fiscal crisis, Philadelphia
December
1968, in response
imposed a $0.05 per share stock
on the PHLX. On January 2,1969,
the PHLX moved
its trad
transfer tax for all transactions
to avoid the tax.
just across the street from the city boundaries
ing floor to an office building
its trading floor back
In February, a court ruled that the tax was illegal, and the PHLX moved
in the city.
to its headquarters
4 For data on the volume of
traded, and
trading prior to the 1850s, the types of securities
and
see Robert E. Wright, Hamilton
Unbound:
Finance
the typical brokerage
commissions,
cen
the Creation
(Westport, Conn., 2002). Prior to the twentieth
Republic
of the American
than were
traded on securities
stocks were more widely
exchanges
tury, bonds and preferred
stan
limited by poor accounting
common
of equities were
and ownership
stocks. Trading
of the evolution of se
about how to value equities. For a good exposition
dards and confusion
1800 and 1940, see Jonathon
curities markets
generally between
Finance
Miranti Jr., A History
(New York, 1997).
of Corporate
5Walter Werner
and Steven T. Smith, Wall Street (New York,

Barron

Baskin

1991), 184.
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and deployment
of the ticker tape during the
City.6 The development
1870s further reinforced the tendency to trade in New York, since it al
in the country nearly contemporane
lowed brokers located anywhere
ous access to stock prices as they were posted on the NYSE.
to the success
Regional exchanges,
including the PHLX, responded
standards
than
those re
of the NYSE by setting less demanding
listing
NYSE.
This
enabled
and
smaller
firms
with
the
younger
pub
quired by
of
licly held securities that were unable to meet the listing requirements
the NYSE to benefit from an organized secondary market. Such a firm's
typical path to success would be to list its securities on a regional ex
or close to a majority
of its
change located close to its headquarters
Once the firm reached sufficient
scale and its securities
shareholders.
on
it
would
list
the NYSE. In some
became
sufficiently widely held,
on the regional ex
to
the
firm
continue
list
its
securities
would
cases,
even
on
a large share of its
if
after
the
NYSE, especially
change
listing
securities were owned by individuals or institutions
located near the re
on a regional ex
The process
of listing securities
gional exchange.
to the NYSE was
in
first
of
change
anticipation
eventually moving
outside New
known as "seasoning."7 Under this system, the exchanges
York tended to trade the securities of the firms that dominated
their re
case
In
the
the
toward
the
end
of
nine
of
the
PHLX, trading
gions.
com
the securities of rail systems, mining
teenth century emphasized
insurance
and
local
banks.8
firms,
panies,
The "Blue Sky" laws that many states enacted in the early twentieth
incentive for firms to list their securities
century provided an additional
on a regional exchange. These
laws offered some protection
against
fraud by requiring that securities sold within a state be registered with
that state's relevant agency, but states commonly exempted firms whose
securities were listed on an organized
from this registration
exchange
created a strong incentive for firms that were
process. The exemption
to list their securities on a re
unable to meet NYSE listing standards
in order to avoid the costs of registering
their securi
gional exchange
states.
ties inmultiple
6

For a rich account of how the telegraph
see Richard B.
influenced U.S. financial markets,
"The Telegraph
in the United
and the Structure
of Markets
DuBoff,
States,
1845-1890,"
in Economic History
Research
8 (1983): 253-77.
7A
"In general the exchanges
financial writer explained,
outside of New
contemporary
York City deal in local securities.
In a sense they serve the New York Stock Exchange
in some
as does the Curb in trying out new securities. Enterprises
what the same manner
which at the
outset appear as local in scope expand
to national
and when
proportions
they do so they
vol. 20 (New York, 1918), 32.
gravitate to New York." Albert W. Atwood, Modern
Business,
8
For an explanation
of the relatively
late development
of secondary markets
in industrial
see Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, "The Rise of the Market
for Industrial
securities,
20 (Spring 1955): 105-38.
Business History
Review
Securities,
1887-1902,"
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The major regional exchanges,
in the
including the PHLX, boomed
1920s as listings and trading increased rapidly.9 In 1923, for example,
shares were traded on the PHLX, about 1 percent of the vol
2.3 million
ume of the NYSE. By 1929, 35.5 million
shares were traded on the
or
NYSE
about
of
volume.
3.1 percent
PHLX,
In the subsequent
crash and economic
stock-market
depression,
on
the
of
listed
the
firms
failed or were ab
many
regional exchanges
sorbed in mergers,
In 1932, for
and trading volume fell precipitously.
on
6.6
PHLX.
In
million
shares
traded
the
addition,
only
example,
states changed their Blue Sky laws to limit exemptions
for securities
listed on regional exchanges,
and the newly created Securities
and Ex
to
Commission
the
(SEC) required
change
exchanges
impose stricter
These
decreased
listing requirements.
developments
greatly
listings
and trading volume on the regional exchanges.10 Gradually
the over
as the loca
the-counter
(OTC) market
replaced the regional exchanges
tion where newly issued equities would trade and become seasoned be
fore the issuing firm might seek a listing on the NYSE or the American
Stock Exchange
(AMEX), then known as the Curb Exchange.
As the regional exchanges
lost listings and trading volume,
they
to
securities
listed on the NYSE and, to a
trade
responded by starting
the PHLX allowed
lesser extent, on the AMEX. In 1931, for example,
on
in
to
the
listed
NYSE, the AMEX, and
any security
begin
trading
some regional exchanges.
not
Since these securities were generally
listed on the PHLX, this was called "unlisted" trading. Not surprisingly,
to trade secu
the move by the regional exchanges
the NYSE challenged
rities listed on the NYSE, but in a series of decisions
during the 1930s,
a decade,
the SEC decided in favor of the regional exchanges.11 Within
the PHLX and the other regional exchanges were mainly trading securi
ties listed on the New York exchanges.
By 1948, for example, only 1.5
percent of the dollar volume of stock trading on the PHLX was in secu
of stocks traded on
rities listed only on that exchange.12 The majority
the PHLX were listed on the NYSE.
9The

are found in U.S. Securities
and Ex
data in this and the subsequent
paragraph
and
of the Securities
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets
change Commission,
Commission
D.C., 1963), part 2, 916-17.
(Washington,
Exchange
10
of the new
standards
In its 1963 study, the SEC explained
that "since the disclosure
of the principal
statute exceeded
standards
the equivalent
meeting
exchanges,
companies
of a listing on the New
and prestige
these standards might well seek the greater publicity
. . .
to a regional listing .... The new statutory requirements
in preference
York exchanges
to the over-the
from the regional
also tended to shift the trading of securities
exchanges
. . . [Securities
now
traded over the counter were free of the requirements
counter market.
attached to securities
11
Ibid., 919-24.
12
U.S. Securities
D.C.,

traded on an exchange."
and Exchange

SEC, Special

Commission,

Eighteenth

Study,

part 2, 918.

Annual

Report

1953), 37
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1950-1974

Since the PHLX was mainly trading the same stocks as the NYSE in
the 1950s and the NYSE had a much greater volume of business, why
would brokers route some trades to the PHLX rather than to the NYSE?
resulted from the retail trades of regional
Initially much of the business
were
not
members
of the NYSE. In the 1960s, mu
firms
that
brokerage
to reward broker
tual funds directed trades to the regional exchanges
were
NYSE
not
of
the
firms
members
but
that
sold shares in
that
age
also directed trades to the PHLX, because
the mutual finds. Institutions
to evade exchange-specified
mini
for institutions
it had created means
mum public trading commissions.
the reasons that orders came to the PHLX, how
Before discussing
ever, it is important to explain how the floor of the PHLX functioned.
As the PHLX evolved
that mainly
into an exchange
traded equities
listed on the NYSE, it also came to resemble more closely a dealer mar
ket than an auction market. This was also true of the other regional ex
In most cases, the only person buying or selling a particular
changes.
stock on the floor of the exchange was the designated
specialist. There
were no competing market makers on the floor, and itwas very rare for
orders to interact directly.13 The
representing
buy-and-sell
to almost all trades was the specialist.14 The specialist's
counterparty
on the spread between his bid and ask price, multi
profits depended
on the
the specialists
plied times the volume of his trades. Because
PHLX were smaller, more poorly capitalized operators than their coun

brokers

terparts on the NYSE, they typically sought to execute a steady flow of
small retail orders.
While
the specialists on the PHLX rarely faced competition
for or
ders from the floor of the exchange,
they did compete to attract trades
in equities that were traded on other exchanges.
To attract this order
that their prices would
flow, the specialists would generally guarantee
be as good, or nearly as good, as those quoted on the NYSE. This prac
tice was common on the regional exchanges. As the SEC explained
in its
13In some
cases, brokers on the floor would execute large orders with each other, but they
these trades off the floor of the exchange.
execute
Brokers would
the
negotiated
rather
trade, known as a "cross," on the PHLX or another
prearranged
regional
exchange
than the NYSE, because
there were far fewer limit orders on the books of the regional ex
changes. The exchanges
require that limit orders that offer better prices, or that were entered
as part of the block trans
earlier with prices identical to the block transaction,
be executed
can therefore
action. A large backlog
of limit orders
a block
and complicate
fragment
generally

transaction.
14
the SEC did not provide data specifically
for the PHLX, in discussing
securi
Although
ties traded on the NYSE or the AMEX that were also traded on a regional exchange,
it stated,
as a dealer in approximately
"The specialist participates
90 percent of all multiple
trading on
the regional exchanges."
SEC, Special Study, part 2, 932.
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1963 study, the regional exchanges
sought "to assure investors as good
on the regional exchange
an execution
as they might
receive on the
to
market.
This
led
the
of
systems to gear prices
principal
development
on the local exchange to those reported on the NYSE ticker tape."15 In
discussing how this system operated on the PHLX, the SEC noted that a
transact at a price that was one-eighth
sometimes
specialist would
the
lower
than
last
($0,125)
printed transaction
price on the NYSE.
Brokers who directed orders to these specialists did not consider this to
to their customers.
be a breach of fiduciary
responsibilities
They rea
soned that "had the order been sent to New York, there is no certainty
in which
that the quote is the market
the customer would have dealt
since there might have been orders ahead of his or the market might
have changed by the time his order arrived."16 In a limited set of cases,
a specialist on the PHLX would match
the price quoted on the NYSE.
As the SEC reported in its 1963 study:
If there are a great many "prints" of GM at 56 on the NYSE tape the
[PHLX] specialist will execute the order at 56 without waiting for
the stock to sell in New York at 56 1/8. The transaction "on volume"
will occur when the volume of sales in New York at the limit price is
such as would indicate that the firm can receive an execution at 56
in New

York.17

listed on the NYSE to the
Brokers directed orders for securities
PHLX for a variety of reasons. Small and medium-sized
brokerage firms
were
often members
in the mid-Atlantic
with their headquarters
region
in the PHLX re
of the PHLX but not the NYSE, since membership
quired far less capital. If such firms received an order to trade a security
of the NYSE for ex
listed on the NYSE and they directed it to amember
ecution, they would have to pay the "public" fixed commission
required
reduce or eliminate
This would
of all nonmembers.18
any profit they
15
Ibid., 915
16
Ibid., 934.
17Ibid.
18
to the exchange
for all trades that
of an exchange
Members
pay a small commission
costs of
helps cover the overhead
they execute on the floor of the exchange. This commission
to execute
who wish to trade on an exchange must ask a member
the exchange. Nonmembers
a "public" commission
for han
the trade on their behalf. The nonmembers
pay the member
to charge a speci
required their members
dling the trade. Prior to 1975, all of the exchanges
commis
Since this was higher than what a free-market
fied minimum
public commission.
and did not
commission
sion would have been, all members
charged the specified minimum
was specified on a
public commission
compete for orders on the basis of price. The minimum
traders paid the same commission
institutional
per share as
per share basis, so large-volume
iden
all the exchanges
small retail traders. In addition, with only minor exceptions,
specified
An investor could
tical minimum
SEC, Special Study, part 2, 299-300.
public commissions.
a trade in a listed security to an over
commission
avoid paying the minimum
by directing
the-counter

dealer who made

a market

in that stock.

But rule 394

of the NYSE
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the order. If such firms, on the other hand,
would gain from originating
executed
the order on the PHLX, they could keep most of the public
commission
paying only a minor member
paid by their customers,
to the PHLX.
commission
Firms that were solely members
of the PHLX would direct some or
ders to the NYSE, either because of the large size of the trade or be
cause the security was not traded on the PHLX. They would have to
to execute these orders on their behalf and pay
choose a NYSE member
Because
the cost to a member
the public commission.
of executing an
order on the NYSE was far below the minimum
public commission,
to attract orders from outsiders. The
members
competed
aggressively
or
to discount public commissions
NYSE did not permit its members
to
attract orders, but the members
offer cash rebates in competing
to a regional ex
could reward outside brokerage firms that belonged
on
to
execute
In
the regional exchange.
change by sending them orders
this way, the brokerage firm that belonged
only to a regional exchange
could indirectly earn public commissions
for handling orders that it di
rected to a NYSE member.
Such orders were referred to as "reciprocal"
order flow, and they accounted
for a significant
share of the trades di
PHLX
rected to the
and other regional exchanges prior to the liberaliza
tion of public commissions.
firms that were members
of the PHLX often
The best-capitalized
to the NYSE. In research conducted
also belonged
for its 1963 study,
the SEC surveyed forty-one of these firms to ask them why they would
direct some of their order flow to the PHLX rather than to the NYSE.
About half of the firms cited one reason as the most
important: "to re
tain a larger percentage
of the commission."19
This reason was likely
mentioned
that did not have execution
and clearing
by dual members
in New York, which meant
facilities
that they would have to pay an
common
other member
of the NYSE to handle these tasks.20 Another
reason that the firms gave for directing orders to the PHLX was "to save
paying the New York State transfer tax." At that time, New York im
tax on the trading of stocks. For stocks that traded
posed a graduated
for $20 or more per share, the tax was $0.04 per share traded. Pennsyl
vania had no such tax. Thirteen of the forty-one firms said they directed

member

firms from routing trading orders for listed stocks to OTC dealers. They were not,
from routing trades to regional
Rule 394 also prohibited
however,
prevented
exchanges.
NYSE member
firms from acting as OTC dealers for listed securities. The effect of these rules
was to limit access to the "third market"
to institutional
investors with the necessary
technol
ogy to communicate
directly with OTC market makers and to compare the prices on the third
to those on the NYSE.
market
19
SEC, Special Study, part 2,1086.
20
Ibid, 938.
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some

trades to the PHLX to "reduce market
impact on the NYSE."
firms were undoubtedly
block
orders. Several dual
breaking up
member firms reported that they directed trades to the PHLX as part of
a reciprocal arrangement
with another member
of the PHLX. Finally,
These

ten of the forty-one dual members
said they directed some trades to the
PHLX because of "orders originating
in the vicinity of the exchange."
were
a
Most
to
desire
likely they
referring
by some Philadelphia-area
trust
bank
and
investors,
departments,
brokerage firms to support local
business

interests.21

While
securities markets were no longer regional by the 1950s, the
NYSE-listed
securities of large Philadelphia-area
firms accounted
for
a disproportionate
share of trades on the floor of the PHLX in the early
for this circumstance
is that
the explanation
Undoubtedly,
at
of
in
firms
the
the
retail
area, especially
ownership
Philadelphia
was
more
in
concentrated
this
than
elsewhere.
When
level,
region
these owners traded their shares, they were more likely to use regional
of the PHLX. Between
1962 and
brokerage firms that were members
on
ten
most
PHLX
for
the
the
traded
stocks
1964,
example,
actively
in one or more of these years included the Philadelphia
Electric Com
1960s.

the Scott Paper Company,
the Sperry Rand Corporation,
the
the
Railroad
and
Company,
Pennsylvania
Transportation
Philadelphia
were based
in the Philadelphia
Company.22 All of these companies
pany,

metropolitan

region.

the shift during the 1930s toward the trading of securities
Despite
listed on the NYSE and AMEX, most of the regional exchanges
experi
enced a consistent decline in their market share of total exchange-listed
either
1930 and i960. Many of the regional exchanges
trading between
closed or merged with others during this period.23 The PHLX was no
In 1949 itmerged with the Baltimore
exchange, and in 1953
exception.
In both cases, the
it merged with the Washington,
D.C., exchange.
PHLX was the far larger entity, and the surviving exchange maintained
these mergers,
the dollar vol
in Philadelphia.
its headquarters
Despite
ume of equity trading on the PHLX was quite low in the early 1950s
21
to encourage
Phila
In the late 1940s, the PHLX created a public relations committee
to direct trades to the PHLX in order to benefit the local
financial
institutions
delphia-area
some institutions
The vice-president
of a local trust bank
economy. Apparently
cooperated.
on the
our brokers
to place as many of our orders as possible
stated, "We have encouraged
James E. Walter,
The Role of Regional
P-BSE [Philadelphia-Baltimore
Stock Exchange]."
1957), 127.
Security Exchanges
(Berkeley,
22
Annual
Stock Exchange,
1962 through
Report,
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington
1964.
23For a detailed
the mergers
of the regional
forces behind
analysis of the economic
J. Harold Mulherin,
1940 and i960, see Tom Arnold,
Philip Hersch,
changes between
54 (June 1999): 1083-107.
of Finance
Jeffry M. Netter,
"Merging Markets," Journal
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Figure

1. PHLX dollar volume

of equity

trading.

Source:

annual

reports

of the SEC.

(see Figure 1).24 It picked up in the latter half of the 1950s, but this was
largely due to a general increase in the volume of trading overall. Dur
share that the PHLX had in exchange-traded
ing the 1950s, the market
hovered
around 1 percent.25
In i960, the
equities
fairly consistently
four largest regional exchanges had a combined market
share of only
It is no wonder
that the 1963 SEC study questioned
the
6.15 percent.
survival prospects of the regional exchanges.
Shortly after the SEC issued its 1963 report, the flow of orders to
the PHLX began to grow rapidly. The dollar volume of shares traded on
the PHLX grew markedly
from 1962 to 1969, and it grew explosively
from 1970 through 1972, before declining just as precipitously
between
1972 and 1974 (see Figure 1). The growth in the dollar volume of trad
ing on the PHLX between
1962 and 1968 was only sufficient to increase
share of exchange-traded
the ex
slightly its market
equities. However,
a 150 percent
in
1969 and 1972 represented
plosive growth between
crease in its market
share. The 1972-74 fall in trading volume was due
in overall volume
in exchange-listed
partly to a decline
equities and
partly to a decline in the market share of the PHLX.
24 In
combine
the volume of the PHLX and the Washing
Figure 1, the data from 1950-53
As noted in the text, the two exchanges merged
ton, D.C. exchanges.
in 1953. At the time of
the merger, volume on the PHLX was fifty times larger than that on the D.C.
exchange.
25Table 1 in the
the overall dollar trading volume of exchange-listed
presents
appendix
securities
and the market
shares of the exchanges
at five-year
In this article, I re
intervals.
share as a percentage
of the dollar value of trading, not the number of shares or
port market
contracts traded.
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Much of the growth in the PHLX's trading volume between
1964
and 1968 came from trades generated by mutual funds. As noted earlier,
the NYSE and the regional exchanges
imposed minimum
public com
with no volume discounts.
missions
Since the cost to a member
firm of
a
a
was
and
trade
for
well
nonmember
below
the
handling
executing
firms competed
commission,
intensely to attract trading or
ders from the public, especially large-volume
trades. Had there been no
rules to prevent
firms
to the NYSE would
that
it, brokerage
belonged
to
to
offer
have
cash
rebates
block traders who
undoubtedly
begun
directed orders to them. But NYSE rules prevented members from issuing
cash rebates to nonmembers.
could only share commissions
Members
with other members.
In the early 1960s, most of the regional exchanges
had rules similar to those of the NYSE, stipulating
that a member
of an

minimum

with other members.26
exchange could only share trading commissions
At the same time, the Investment
Company Act of 1940 placed a
on
commissions
that
mutual
funds
could pay retail sales orga
the
cap
to exceed this cap in order
nizations.
Since mutual
funds often wished
to sweeten the incentive for retail brokerage firms to sell shares in their
funds, they found several ways to evade the cap. If a firm selling shares
in the mutual
of the NYSE, the fund could reward
fund was a member
the firm by asking it to execute trades on the fund's behalf, paying the
firm the fixed commission
for this service. If the mutual fund preferred
to use its traditional NYSE-member
firm for executing
trades, it could
with another NYSE
direct that firm to share its trading commission
to reward. This was known as a
firm that the fund wished
member
"give-up." But many small brokerage firms that sold shares in mutual
of the NYSE. However,
funds to retail clients were not members
there
was a way to reward them for these sales if they were members
of a re
If the firm that traditionally
executed
trades for the
gional exchange.
of a regional exchange,
the fund could
mutual
fund was also a member
ask the firm to execute some trades on the regional exchange and share
of the regional exchange
the commissions
with another member
that
to reward. In the early 1960s, such arrangements
the fund wished
share of the order flow on regional ex
for a substantial
accounted
could handle the associated
large
changes.27 The regional exchanges
off the floor of
block trades because the trades were often prearranged
the

exchange.

26
some dis
As of 1963, the Pacific Coast, Detroit,
and Cincinnati
exchanges
permitted
firms. SEC, Special Study, part 2, 936.
for nonmember
of commissions
brokerage
the PHLX and other regional exchanges
below, by the mid-1960s
joined these three
a form of discounting
with nonmem
in permitting
through commission-sharing
exchanges
ber brokerage firms.
27
SEC, Special Study, part 2, 316-17.

counting
As noted
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In 1965, to attract even more business
based on mutual
fund
directed give-ups,
the PHLX changed its rules to permit commissions
to be shared with brokerage
firms that were not members
of the
PHLX.28 Since some small brokerage firms that sold shares in mutual
funds were not members
of any exchange, mutual
funds could direct
trading orders to the PHLX in order to reward them.29
A second factor that increased the market share of the PHLX in the
was an increase in taxes on security trades in New York City.
mid-1960s
The PHLX reported, "A one cent increase in the New York Stock Transfer
Tax, from four to five cents during the year, advertised the fact that there
had been no such tax for many years in any of the States where regional
exchanges are located. This attracted block orders to all of them_"3?
The New York Stock Exchange was, of course, unhappy
to see
trades that would normally be executed on its floor diverted to regional
It lobbied the SEC to halt all cash give-ups. The SEC agreed
exchanges.
with the NYSE that give-ups
could undermine
fixed trading commis
sions and weaken
the cap on mutual-fund
In De
sales commissions.
cember
all
commission
ended
when
the
1968,
splitting
exchanges
bowed to pressure from the SEC and agreed to ban the practice.31
The loss of institutional
business
associated with the end of give
ups could have been a major blow to the PHLX. It was not, however,
because the PHLX instituted two new measures
to attract institutional
trades. In the 1960s, the NYSE did not allow institutions
active in a
wide range of activities to become members
of the exchange. Member
purpose was serving the
ship was open only to entities whose primary
In addition, the NYSE did not per
public as brokers or market makers.
mit foreign-owned
securities firms to become members.
This forced
securities
large foreign banks, many of which actively traded American
on behalf of clients, to pay the public commission
in order to trade on
the NYSE. Prior to 1967, the PHLX had similar policies. But beginning
in 1967, the PHLX allowed securities firms that were owned by mutual
fund companies,
insurance companies,
financial
institu
foreign-owned
tions or other institutions
to become members.32
By early 1971, thirty
28

Stock Exchange, Annual Report,
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington
1965.
29Other
similar give-up provisions.
re
As Business
Week
regional exchanges
adopted
raked in heavy trading from institutional
investors because neither
ported, "[The regionals]
. . .Thus,
the Big Board nor the AMEX allowed give-ups
of commissions
to nonmembers.
a mutual
whenever
to reward a small brokerage firm that sold its
fund, for example, wanted
shares or provided
research but which did not belong to any exchange,
it could direct its bro
ker to place an order through one of the six regionals
that permitted
to nonmem
give-ups
bers." Business Week, 3 Jan. 1970, 74.
30
Stock Exchange, Annual Report,
1966.
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington
31Business
Week, 3 Jan. 1970, 74.
32 Joel
The Transformation
and
Seligman,
of Wall Street: A History
of the Securities
Commission
and Modern
Finance
Exchange
(Boston, 1982), 396.
Corporate
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nine such institutionally
affiliated securities firms had joined the PHLX
and had begun to trade on behalf of the institutions
that owned them.33
The institutional
investors still had to pay the minimum
public com
but they paid it to firms owned by the institutions
themselves.
mission,
In this way, mutual
funds and other institutions
that traded high vol
umes of equities effectively
received a discount
from public commis
Not
sions.
this strategy was very successful for the PHLX.
surprisingly,
In 1968, 37 percent of its stock-trading
volume came from institutional
amount
the
had
grown to 45 percent.34
trades; by 1969,
In 1968, the PHLX took a third measure
to attract trading orders to
It doubled the number of seats, cutting the price of own
the exchange.
it feasible for even very small brokerage
ing a seat in half. This made
to reward these new
firms to join the PHLX. If a mutual
fund wished
for selling shares in the fund, it could pay them the standard
some trades. Business Week reported
commission
for handling
public
as the Philadelphia-Baltimore
then
known
of
the
admiringly
exchange,

members

Washington

(PBW) Exchange:

In 1968, its volume was up 25% to 48 million
ous

year.

In 1969,

volume

rose

another

23%.

shares from the previ
Two

moves

initiated

by

the exchange's president, Elkins Wetherill,
helped to keep trading
volume high: Doubling
the number of seats and allowing institu
tions to become members.
By cutting the cost of a seat in half (to
sell
mutual funds and which once were
small
firms
that
$16,500),
with

rewarded
tutions

could

give-ups

join

and

receive

PBW is also picking up business

directly_The

and

members

become

save

on

commissions

commissions

by letting the insti
....

Liquidity

is

no problem because in the case of large blocks of stock both the sale
and purchase (a so-called cross) are arranged beforehand and then
executed

on

the

floor

of

the

exchange.35

as
During the 1960s, not all regional exchanges were as successful
the PHLX. Several failed or were absorbed. One example was the Pitts
By 1968, its share of the dollar value of all equity
burgh Exchange.
trades on exchanges
had fallen to 0.03 percent.36 This was too little
volume to justify operating the exchange, and in 1969 the PHLX agreed
two years, the PHLX closed the trading floor in
to absorb it.Within
Pittsburgh.

33Elkins
before the
in Securities
Wetherill,
Study, Part l, Hearing
Testimony
Industry
on Banking, Housing,
on Securities
and Urban Affairs, U.S.
of the Committee
Subcommittee
21 Sept. 1971, 217-18.
Senate, 92nd Congress,
34
Stock Exchange, Annual Report,
1969.
Philadelphia
35Business
74.
Week, 3 Jan.1970,
36United States Securities
and Exchange Commission,
35th Annual Report
(Washington,
D.C., 1969), 193
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The market
share of the PHLX grew strongly between
1968 and
1972. But over this same period, two serious threats appeared on the
horizon. First, by the late 1960s there was much criticism of fixed trad
and many influential groups were advocating deregu
ing commissions,
of the PHLX came from institutions
lation. Since much of the business
that were trying to evade fixed trading commissions,
freeing the com
the viability of the exchange.
in
missions
could threaten
Beginning
a
hint
of
this
On
the
1971,
possibility.
exchange
experienced
April 5,
rates on orders above
commission
1971, the SEC approved negotiated
to redirect some of their large trades to
This led institutions
$500,000.
the NYSE, as they could now negotiate
The
discounted
commissions.
SEC action explains much of the fall in the market
share of the PHLX
that began in 1972.
In a second threat to the PHLX, beginning
in 1972 the SEC began
to pressure
to exclude
the exchanges
from membership
brokerage
investors. The PHLX lobbied
firms that were owned by institutional
directed
the
against this policy.37 But in 1975 Congress
a
on
on
firms
business
ban
behalf
adopt
transacting
brokerage
accounts. The ban was to become
ated institutional
effective
but as it turned out this had little practical effect, since fixed
were liberalized inMay 1975.
commissions
hard

An Era of Innovation:

SEC to
of affili
in 1978,
trading

1975-1983

The liberalization
of trading commissions
could have sounded the
death knell for the PHLX, but it did not, because the PHLX introduced
an automated
that met the needs of the emerging
trading technology
discount brokerage firms. It also began to trade equity options, which, as
explained below, were largely immune to threats from other competing
securities exchanges. And the PHLX created an options market for foreign
for several years from its first-mover
benefiting
advantage.
inMay 1975, exchanges were no longer
Equity Trading.
Beginning
to specify minimum
commissions
for nonmembers
permitted
trading
with them. This led to a rapid fall in commissions,
the com
especially
missions
investors.
Institutions
paid per share traded by institutional
that had been directing many of their trades to regional exchanges be
gan to return to the NYSE. After all, it was the market with the most
competitive
bidding on the floor and the only exchange capable of ab
currencies,

sorbing fairly large trades in widely held equities.
In 1978, there was a second major change in securities markets:
the
of the Intermarket Trading System (ITS). The ITS linked
inauguration
37Business

Week,

26 Feb.

1972, 22-23.
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the floors of the exchanges,
traders on the floor of any ex
enabling
see
on
to
and
transactions
all the others and to route or
change
prices
ders to another exchange. Traders were expected either to match or to
exceed the best bid or offer price shown on any other exchange, known
as the national best bid or offer (NBBO), or to route their orders to an
exchange quoting the NBBO.
a seller or buyer could conduct his or her
Belying the terminology,
at the NBBO and still not receive the best price in the mar
transaction
ket. The NBBO
is the best quoted price to buy or sell a stock up to a
specified quantity limit. But dealers and brokers are often reluctant to
to pay. This is because
quote the very best price they are willing
they
hope to pay less than the maximum
figure, and because the maximum
to pay depends on how well informed they believe
that they are willing
their counterparty
to sell at
is. If a well-informed
counterparty wants
can
assume
the
that
the
stock
well
dealer
be
worth
less
$X,
price
might
than $X. Quoting conservative bid-and-offer
reduces
the
chances
prices
that the dealer will be taken advantage
of by well-informed
traders.
However, when a typical "uninformed" retail order comes to the floor of
an exchange such as the NYSE, where several brokers and dealers com
monly compete to get such orders, the rivalry often forces them to offer
prices superior to the best quoted bid-or-offer
prices. This "price im
provement" means that investors frequently obtained a price somewhat
rare on
were comparatively
better than the NBBO. Price improvements
the floors of the regional exchanges,
since the specialists generally did
not face competition
for orders from dealers or brokers on their floors.
The specialists on the regional exchanges would, as required, match the
NBBO or send the trade to another exchange, but they generally did not
that cropped up on the NYSE.
match any price improvement
led to the rise of
commissions
The 1975 deregulation
of brokerage
firms
that
low
fees
for
"discount" brokerage
providing basic re
charged
for handling
tail trading services. Since they charged low commissions
the trades, in order to make a profit they had to execute these trades at
a very low cost. Moreover,
since the profit on each trade was small, they
scrambled to handle a high volume of retail trades. Thus, the discount
executions
of their trades
brokers preferred
fast, reliable, automated
or costly searches
to time-consuming
for
for the best price possible
their customers' trades. Discount brokers argued that, inmost cases, their
than they would achieve
customers gained more from low commissions
to get the small price improvements
from paying higher commissions
executions.
often associated with less automated
to the changes that diminished
its order flow
The PHLX responded
meet
to
the needs of
traders by developing
from institutional
systems
a
It
small-value
order
retail discount brokers.
hoped that high volume of
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two
and its members
the exchange
by providing
First, the exchange could gain revenue, since itwas
data to the "consolidated
trade-execution
paid for reporting
tape," a
Second, spe
system that collected trading data from all the exchanges.
coun
cialists on the exchange
could profit from serving as consistent
terparties to the retail trades, since the specialists' bid prices were al
ways below their offer prices. But to attract the order flow from the
reliable
emerging discount brokers, the PHLX had to offer automated,
at prices close to the best prices available anywhere. To do
executions
so, in 1975 the PHLX introduced a computerized
system for handling
and executing
Stock Exchange Auto
orders, called the Philadelphia
or PACE for short.
mated
Communication
and Execution
System,
PACE would route an entered retail order to the proper specialist. Or
ders that met predetermined
criteria could be executed automatically
that the price of the trade would
by the specialist, who would guarantee
match the NBBO.38
of retail order flow by several
Partly in response to the automation
of the regional exchanges
and third-market
dealers, the NYSE also au
Or
tomated much of its retail order flow by introducing
its Designated
der Turnaround
1976.39 But PACE was more
System (DOT) in March
than DOT, a factor that the discount brokers valued.
fully automated
The DOT system, for example, had a built-in delay to permit brokers on
the floor to better the price offered by the specialist or displayed
in the
flow could sustain
sources of revenue.

limit book. PACE did not have this feature. By late 1977,
specialist's
PACE accounted
for about 12 percent of the PHLX's share volume, and
the PHLX reported
that "a great percentage
of the volume
coming
new
is
PACE
order flow for the Exchange?orders
which would
through
have been diverted to other markets
in the past."40
38
on this basis became common for the regional exchanges
and OTC dealers.
Competing
the SEC reported,
In
"[Retail] orders are very rarely routed on the basis of quotations.
are made on the basis of preexisting
ser
where
stead, order routing decisions
arrangements
vice and costs are paramount
as a factor because all mar
and execution
quality is eliminated
at the BBO. Once the order is routed this way, it is rare that itwill
kets guarantee
execution
be sent to another market because
the best quote will be matched
instead of rerouting the or
der via ITS. Thus, market makers have little incentive to compete based on quotes. According
to the Regional
it ismore effective to compete by marketing
Exchanges,
quicker and cheaper
executions
to attract orders through displayed
than by attempting
United States
quotations."
Securities
and Exchange Commission,
2000
Market
D.C, 1994), A VI40.
(Washington,
39The DOT
did not allow
system later evolved into SuperDOT. As with DOT, SuperDOT
for fully automated
executions
since NYSE rules required the specialist
to expose incoming
orders to the crowd for possible
New York Stock Exchange
price improvements.
Special
on Market
Committee
and Ownership,
Structure
Market
Structure,
Governance,
Report,

As

2000, 24.
40
Stock Exchange, Annual
Philadelphia
credited PACE with attracting
significant
1986, C12.

into the 1980s, news
1977. Well
Report,
retail order flow. Philadelphia
Inquirer,
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Figure

1976

2. PHLX dollar volume

1977

of equity

1978

trading.

1979

Source:

1981

1980

annual

reports

1982

1983

of the PHLX.

a significant
Between
in
1974 and 1983 the PHLX experienced
crease in the dollar value of its equity trading volume
(see Figure 2).
But despite the PHLX's efforts to attract a high volume of retail trades,
it lost market
share relative to the combined
share of the other ex
to 1.5 percent from 2.3
share
its
market
had
declined
changes. By 1983,
In
in
the
other
efforts
of the PHLX to
1974.
words,
percent
despite
attract the order flow of retail trades, the exchange
lost market
share
as large institutional
the 1975
orders returned to the NYSE following
of fixed trading commissions.
deregulation
On June 27, 1975, the PHLX began to
Stock and Index Options.
It was the third exchange to do so. The Chi
trade options on equities.
this path when it
(CBOE) had pioneered
cago Board Options Exchange
in April 1973. Prior to that, options on
began to trade stock options
market.
equities had been traded only in an opaque over-the-counter
Interest in trading options on the CBOE developed
rapidly. In January
to
the second exchange
Stock Exchange
became
1975, the American
It was followed shortly afterwards by the PHLX
trade equity options.
and the Pacific Stock Exchange.
When
the PHLX introduced options trading, it started on a limited
basis and expanded over time. Initially, for example, the PHLX traded
only call options on five stocks.41 It slowly added other call options
41The
to purchase a stock from the
buyer of a call option has the right, but not the obligation,
seller of the option at a predetermined
price by a specified date. The buyer of a put option has
the right to sell a stock to the seller of the put option at a predetermined
price by a specified date.
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over the next few years. The PHLX began to trade put options
in June
1977.
The main reason that the PHLX was slow to add new equity op
tions was that the CBOE and the AMEX were already trading the most
desirable equity options by the time the PHLX began to look for con
tracts to trade. Prior to 1977, although
there was no rule preventing
them from doing so, the exchanges
rarely traded option contracts that
were already traded on another exchange. People later charged that the
options exchanges would not begin to trade an option contract traded
on another exchange because of an implicit agreement
to limit compe
ex
In
tition among the exchanges.
addition, the SEC and the exchanges
concerns
about multiple
contracts,
since,
pressed
trading of options
the options exchanges were not linked.
unlike the equity exchanges,
This meant that there was no organized
system to tell traders instantly
on one exchange the quoted bid-and-offer
prices and volumes on other
was
no
ensure
to
that a trade on one ex
And
there
process
exchanges.
a
occur
at
not
would
less
favorable
change
price than that available on
another exchange.42 The SEC worried that public investors might be ex
and that the continuity and liquid
ploited in such fragmented markets
be
of
the
markets
could
impaired.
ity
the trading of the same option contract on more than one
Although
exchange was rare, it was becoming more common as the exchanges
competed for order flow.43 In 1977, the SEC acted on its concerns about
on the trading of new
market
by placing a moratorium
fragmentation
equity options while it studied the options market and considered how
to handle the multiple-trading
the exchanges did not
issue.44 Although
a
the
the SEC did not want
moratorium,
develop
linkage system during
to sustain the moratorium
it
and
lifted
it in March
1980.
indefinitely,
on
were not linked,
Still concerned about multiple
markets
that
trading
in June 1980 the SEC initiated a lottery for allocating the right to trade
any new options on equities. Under this system, the exchanges would
to trade. The
provide a list to the SEC of equity options that they wished
SEC would
then use a lottery to allocate the exclusive right to trade
these options to specific exchanges. This system remained in place until
never developed
a
1990. Over these ten years, the options exchanges
42Traders on the floor of one
on another
could follow prices and transactions
exchange
data through third-party
but this capability
still would not
vendors,
exchange by obtaining
order routing system.
provide the traders with an intermarket
43 Investment
Dealer's Digest,
17 Aug. 1992,14.
44The PHLX
this move:
"The imposed options moratorium,
at
supported
temporarily
least, answers our request for the halt to dual option trading. Earlier in the year, the PHLX
to call attention
to a so-called dual trading war which was occurring between
the
attempted
in their attempts
to capture increased order flow." Philadelphia
Stock Ex
options exchanges
change, Annual

Report,

1977.
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1975

Figure

1976

3. PHLX dollar volume

1977

of equity

1978

option

1979

trades.

1980

Source:

1981

annual

reports

1982

1983

of the SEC.

system to link their markets,
although they were persistently
pressured
so.
SEC
to
the
do
by
Under the SEC lottery system, the flow of option trades to the ex
on their ability to attract business
for the options
changes depended
were
to
on
the
moratorium
of
and
their luck in
1977
they
trading prior
new
to
the
trade
desirable
obtaining
right
equity options through the
the PHLX did well. The volume of equity op
lottery. By these measures
tions traded on the exchange grew consistently
between
1975 and 1983
(see Figure 3). After 1978, the growth was particularly
rapid. The mar
ket share that the PHLX had in equity options hovered around 3 per
cent between
this period, the CBOE, with its
1976 and 1978. During
first-mover
advantage, had over 70 percent of the market. The AMEX's
market
share hovered
around 20 percent.45 But the rapid growth in
1978 and 1983 resulted in a
equity option trades on the PHLX between
share. By 1983, it had almost 9 percent of the
tripling of its market
overall volume of exchange-traded
equity options. This created bus
tling activity on the options floor, for unlike the equity floor, itwas ac
tive with brokers and specialists,
and with market makers
trading for
their own accounts.46
These were heady days among option traders
45Table 2 in the
appendix provides data on the overall volume of equity options
trading
and the market
shares of the exchanges.
46This was also true on the
currency options floor during its best years. In both cases, the
in which national prices were set rather than, as in the case of the
PHLX was a primary market
equity floor, a secondary market that based its prices on those determined
by another exchange.
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of the easy money

to be

made.47

in op
there was a little-noticed
development
of that
later benefit the PHLX. In December
began to trade options on indices reflecting the price
firms in a particular
economic
sector.48 Since these
one
to be purely a bet
in
consider
them
could
settled
cash,
only
options
a
on the market-weighted
in
of
stocks
average price
particular economic
sector. The PHLX began with two such sector indices, a precious-metals
index. Initially there was little trading
index and a gaming-and-hotel
volume in such sector index options, but that would change over time.

At the end of
tions trading that
year, the exchange
of the equities of

1983,
would

in
the PHLX demonstrated
Although
Currency Options.
foresight
to
to
not
it
claim
trade
could
relatively early
equity options,
moving
It simply copied the innovation
this development.
have pioneered
the PHLX was
launched by the CBOE. In the case of currency options,
the innovator.
In the late 1970s, there was a huge spot market
in foreign curren
forward and exchange-based
futures
cies and active over-the-counter
markets. There was no organized market for foreign-currency
options.
of the PHLX at the time, proposed
that
Arnold Staloff, a staff member
the PHLX should begin to trade options on foreign currencies. With the
and some key members
of the exchange,
backing of PHLX management
to obtain approval
from
he started a long and complicated
process
was that laws in the United States
the SEC.49 One major complication
treated foreign currencies as commodities,
and the commodity exchanges
were
Futures Trading
Commission
by the Commodities
regulated
futures exchanges were de
(CFTC). The CFTC and the Chicago-based
to prevent SEC-regulated
termined
such as the PHLX, from
entities,
centers
for
becoming
trading currency options. Since the SEC already
to over
regulated option trading in equities, itwas equally determined
see options on other financial instruments,
currencies.
including foreign
After much political and legal maneuvering,
the SEC and the CFTC finally
reached a compromise,
known as the Shad-Johnson
Accord, in late 1981.
Under the terms of the compromise,
the SEC was to oversee exchange
based trading in options on foreign currencies.
the
Shortly afterward,
SEC permitted
the PHLX to start trading foreign-currency
options.
47Loren
Dec. 1983,189-218.
Feldman,
"They're in the Money," Philadelphia
Magazine,
48Securities
12 Dec. 1983,11. The CBOE was the first options exchange
to trade a
Week,
stock-market
index option. It initiated trading on a broad market
index inMarch
1983. New
11 Apr. 1983, D9. The CBOE and AMEX began trading index options on nar
York Times,
rower economic
sectors in September
1983. Securities Week, 5 Sept. 1983, 9.
49 For an
account of the efforts by the PHLX to develop and market
entertaining
foreign
The Vandals Crown: How Rebel Currency Traders
currency options, see Gregory J. Millman,
Overthrew
the World's Central Banks (New York, 1995).
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The PHLX opened
its currency option trading floor on December
To
its new product, the PHLX initiated a series
10,1982.
help promote
to
how it had structured its
to
seminars
market
of
explain
professionals
use of exchange-traded
to
the
market
and
currency options
promote
In the first year of trad
and
for
currency options
speculation.
hedging
to
for
be
success.50
the
headed
Trading volume
ing,
product appeared
started small and grew slowly but steadily. Orders came from small
and financial businesses, many
scale speculators and from nonfinancial
based in Europe, that used the exchange to hedge risks.

Some

Boom Years

and Some New

Threats:

1984-2000

included some of the most
The period from 1984 through 2000
times. Volume was heavy on
successful years for the PHLX in modern
almost all stock markets,
including the PHLX. In addition, the two new
and currency
from the previous
options
period?equity
products
brought a very high volume of order flow and associated high incomes
to many PHLX members
for extended periods.
of the exchange
and managers
At the same time, many members
worried that the success was likely to be short lived. There were no bar
that would
riers to entry, other than the PHLX's first-mover
advantage,
in
SEC
the
And
of
its
dominance
currency options.
repeatedly
protect
held by the options
dicated that itwas dissatisfied with the monopolies
in the majority
of equity options. The SEC pushed hard for
exchanges
to create a linkage system and move to multiple
the options exchanges
held high hopes for the future of pure eq
listings. Few PHLX members
to lose market
share in this arena,
PHLX
The
continued
uity trading.
felt a need for ever higher trading volumes as average
and its members
profits per trade were squeezed by the need to pay for order flow and by
narrowing
spreads between bid and offer prices.
These concerns, as well as the recognition that the PHLX would have
to spend large sums to keep its software, hardware, and self-regulatory
of several
led to explorations
functions
abreast of other exchanges,
and
between
with
other
1993. None
1989
merger possibilities
exchanges
of these came to fruition, but several years later, in 1998, the PHLX
came very close to merging with the AMEX.51 The merger was called off
50Financial
Times, 6 Oct. 1983,116.
51 In June
from the AMEX.
agreed to a merger proposal
1998 the PHLX Board tentatively
of
and thought it had to invest many millions
Itwas reported that PHLX lagged in technology
Dealers Digest,
dollars to catch up. Investment
15 June 1998, 5-6. The AMEX, on the other
of orders, cancel
that allowed for electronic processing
hand, had state-of-the-art
technology
and the
orders. The desire of the PHLX to gain AMEX's technology
lations, and replacement
the merger.
motivated
to gain PHLX's options
business
desire of the AMEX
apparently
to New York
PHLX's options business would have moved
the terms of the merger,
Under
City. The merger

plans were

aborted

in April

1999.
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in the options
be advantageous

industry
to both

parties.52

The period from 1984 to 2000 was not one that purely relied on the
innovations from the previous era. During these fifteen years, the PHLX
In March
innovation.
made one further significant
1988, after a two
PHLX
to approve its
the
the
SEC
asked
year costly development
effort,
or
to
trade
"cash
index
"CIPs"
for short.
participations,"
application
The CIP was to trade like a stock but, like a futures index, its price
would depend on the value of an index of stocks. Unlike a futures index,
the CIP would pay a quarterly dividend based on the dividends
of the
stocks in the index, and itwould have no expiration date. Shortly after
the PHLX filed its application with the SEC, the AMEX and the CBOE
applied to trade very similar products.53 The PHLX asked the SEC to
permit it to trade CIPs for several months before giving the green light
to the trading of similar products at the other exchanges,
but the SEC
gave its approval for the simultaneous
launching of the products at all
Soon after the CIP began to trade on the options floor
three exchanges.
of the PHLX, the CFTC brought a lawsuit, arguing that CIP-type products
were

futures contracts and should be regulated by the CFTC and traded
on futures exchanges.
In August
1989, a federal court ruled in favor of
to stop trad
the CFTC and ordered the PHLX and the other exchanges
to redesign its CIP
ing CIPs.54 They all did so, but the AMEX worked
as a product that should
type product in order to avoid its designation
55 In
be traded on a futures exchange.
1993, the AMEX introduced an
for the CIP. In subsequent
"exchange traded fund," the replacement
years this became a highly successful product for the AMEX.
to creating the CIP, the PHLX opened a futures ex
In addition

Board of Trade (PBOT), inMay 1985.56
change, named the Philadelphia
The first securities
traded on the PBOT were cash-settled
options on
on an over-the-counter
Eurodollars
futures and a futures contract

52
23 Apr. 1999, Dl.
Philadelphia
Inquirer,
53A former official of the PHLX informed me
during an interview that the PHLX and the
other exchanges
faxed to each other copies of proposed
so
routine rule changes
commonly
a unified
set of rules. According
an administrative
to this individual,
they could maintain
assistant
at the PHLX mistakenly
faxed copies of PHLX's plans for the CIP to the other ex
to immediately present the SEC with copycat proposals.
changes, enabling the other exchanges
54
the president
of the PHLX
19 June 1990, El. Nicholas Giordano,
Philadelphia
Inquirer,
at the time, was obviously
frustrated with the CFTC. One trade journal quoted him as saying,
"The CFTC should stick to what it is good at...
like regulating pork bellies." Banker,
1 Jan.
1990, 3.
55The PHLX had a futures
and could have reintroduced
the CIP as a futures
exchange
product, but it did not do so. In its view, the CIP could not succeed as a futures product, since
far fewer brokers were qualified
to trade futures contracts
than spot contracts.
56New York Times, 13May 1985, D5.
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Figure

4. PHLX dollar

volume

equity

shares

traded.

Source:

annual

reports

of the PHLX.

index. Due to a lack of interest, the exchange
stock-market
stopped
it introduced
in 1986. In the same year, however,
both
products
trading
It hoped
trading in futures contracts on a variety of foreign currencies.
that traders on its currency options floor might direct trades to the
PBOT to hedge their risk exposures. The PBOT had up-and-down
years
a
en
as
late
but
in
to
the
tied
markets,
currency
general activity
closely
trant it never gained more than a tiny share of the foreign-currency
dur
In 1999, the PHLX closed the PBOT. Nevertheless,
futures market.
an
an
PHLX
hosted
the
in
which
the
eq
floor,
equity-trading
years
ing
was
a
it
futures
a
and
market,
floor,
currency options
uity options floor,
in the country.
the most diversified
exchange
of just a few down years, eq
the
With
Markets.
exception
Equity
on
PHLX
the
volume
grew strongly from 1984 through
uity trading
2000 (see Figure 4). This reflected the general boom in equity markets
over this period, and, in fact, the market share of the PHLX fell despite
the growth in the volume of trading. The growing order flow fed the
But there were
profits of specialists on the PHLX and other exchanges.
of
cut
the
into
that
specialists on the ex
profits
offsetting developments
to attract a high
more
even
for
essential
it
made
and
specialists
change
volume of order flow.
to attract retail order flow,
and OTC dealers competed
Specialists
the bid and ask price.
since they could profit from the spread between
for this order flow, specialists on the re
in competing
Not surprisingly,
incentives to
financial
gional exchanges and OTC dealers began to offer
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brokerage firms that were willing to direct orders to them. This became
it is not clear who initi
known as "payment for order flow." Although
there were reports that
ated the practice and when, by the mid-1980s
the practice was common among OTC dealers.57 Discount brokers, who
were competing with each other to charge the lowest trading commis
for order flow. These
sion, were particularly
likely to seek payments
costs by means
other
enabled them to cover their operating
payments
than

commissions.

on the PHLX began to pay
is no record of when specialists
Al
for order flow, but the practice
likely started in the mid-1980s.58
attract
it
the
order
it
reduced
their
the
flow,
helped
specialists
though
profits on each trade. Thus, the specialists' profits associated with the
rapid increase in trading volume were less than they would have been
had the specialists not had to pay for much of the order flow.
of the PHLX were acutely aware that the exchange
The managers
on
needed to attract high volumes of orders to support the specialists
There

to large financial
in
the equity floor. In the mid-1980s,
they appealed
area to direct some
stitutions
located in the Philadelphia metropolitan
to the PHLX.59 But this appeal appar
of their stock-trading
business
In
February 1993, the PHLX began to trade se
ently had little effect.60
were
listed on the NASDAQ.61 The SEC had approved
lected stocks that
a
on
limited basis in 1986, and on a more extensive
this possibility
in
basis
1990. The Chicago Stock Exchange
began to trade a subset of
stocks in May 1987 and attracted sufficient volume to
NASDAQ-listed
maintain
the effort. The PHLX thought that it too might attract order
flow for several of the NASDAQ-listed
stocks in which it had active op
and the PHLX halted
tions markets,
but the effort was unsuccessful,
in
in
the
stocks
NASDAQ
trading
early 1996.62
In the late 1990s, spreads between bid and offer prices narrowed,
which further reduced specialists' profits for a given volume of orders.
57Jane
Sasseen,
17 June 1985, 203.
"Dirty Little Secret," Forbes,
58The SEC announced
in early 1986 that itwould
for
informally study the use of payment
on the exchanges.
order flow among dealers
for listed securities
Securities
17 Feb.
Week,
1986,4.
59
18 Apr. 1986, C12.
Philadelphia
Inquirer,
60
In interviews,
two former presidents
of the PHLX told me that Boston-area
financial
institutions
have long supported
the Boston
Stock Exchange
that it receives
by ensuring
some of their stock-trading
orders. They lamented
that, at least in the 1980s, Philadelphia
area financial
institutions were not equally supportive
of the PHLX. This reminded me of the
E. Digby Baltzeil
claim by the sociologist
that the wealthy
families of Boston have always
been much more civic spirited than upper-class
E. Digby Baltzeil, Puritan
Philadelphians.
Boston
and Quaker Philadelphia:
Two Protestant
Ethics and the Spirit of Class Authority
and Leadership
(Free Press, 1979). As indicated by the title of his book, Baltzell attributed
to the religious heritages
this difference
of the two cities.
61
Stock Exchange, Annual Report,
1992.
Philadelphia
62
Securities Week, 7 Jan. 2002, 4.
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con
One force behind the narrowing of spreads was the SEC-mandated
in fractions
version from pricing
of a dollar to pricing
in decimals.
Whereas
prior to 1999 the narrowest possible spread was one-sixteenth,
or $0.0625, by 2001, itwas one penny. The switch to pricing in finer in
crements

it significantly
intended:
exactly what its advocates
of
average spreads.63 A second force behind the narrowing
In response to its concerns about payments
spreads was SEC pressure.
on bro
for order flow, the SEC indicated that itwould look unfavorably
kers who routinely sent orders to markets
offering NBBO without price
This put pressure on the regional exchange
improvements.
specialists
to trade at prices that were superior to the NBBO, enabling brokers who
to argue that their customers
routed their trades to these exchanges
were receiving competitive
nar
prices. But such price improvement
achieved

narrowed

In June 1998, the PHLX mod
rowed the spread received by specialists.
offer a price that was superior
ified PACE so that itwould automatically
to the NBBO for many
the
trades.64 Subsequently,
by one-sixteenth
to refine this automatic price-improvement
PHLX continued
feature.
to generate higher volumes
of trading
Under
increasing pressure
the PHLX announced
that it
orders for its equity floor, in mid-2000
communication
network
had formed a partnership with an electronic
services that started in
(ECN). ECNs are computerized
order-matching
share of trades in
the late 1990s. By 2000, they had gained a significant
OTC stocks, but only a minor share of trades in exchange-listed
stocks,
a situation
and
they were trying to remedy.65 But to display widely
to
ECNs
needed
for
their
securities,
quotes
exchange-listed
promptly
access
to
that
the
the
consolidated
quote system (CQS)
exchanges
gain
use. ECNs could show their quotes on NASDAQ's
Computer Assisted
System (CAES), which interfaced with the Intermarket Trad
ing System (ITS) that enabled trades to be routed to the floor of any of
no part of the ITS be
But many ECNs wanted
the equity exchanges.
cause they considered
and slow.66 For one thing,
it to be unreliable
to trade, Exchange B
when Exchange A sent Exchange B a commitment
to respond. For most automated
had up to two minutes
trading opera
tions, this was far too long to wait.
as ECNs
beneficial
The PHLX envisioned mutually
opportunities
Execution

63One

recent study estimated
that spreads narrowed by about 28 percent for NYSE-listed
and Luba
See a report issued by Lehman Brothers written by Maureen
Murphy
11 Feb. 2002,18.
"Trading Places: The Future of U.S. Equity Market Structure,"
Krayterman,
64PR
1 June 1998.
Newswire,
65
in exchange-listed
stocks. Mur
about 5 percent of the volume
By 2001, ECNs handled
"Trading Places."
phy and Krayterman,
66
Communica
"The Emergence
of Electronic
and Chris Stefanadis,
James McAndrews
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Is
in the U.S. Equity Markets,"
tions Networks
sues in Economics
and Finance
6, no. 12 (2000).
securities.
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Figure

5. PHLX dollar volume

equity

option

trades.

Source:

annual

reports

of the SEC.

stocks. In
sought to increase their volume of trading in exchange-listed
an agreement with the Bloomberg
June 2000,
it announced
Trade
an
ECN
that
served
institutional
the
Under
investors.67
book,
mainly
could go through the PHLX to post its quotes on
agreement, Bloomberg
listed securities on the CQS. The PHLX, in turn, hoped to gain equity
order flow from the Bloomberg
and get transaction
and
agreement
fees from any trades that Bloomberg
market-data
The
generated.
PHLX announced
that it would
like to strike similar deals with other
such efforts to increase order flow on the equity floor of
ECNs.68 While
the PHLX might pay off over time, by 2000 the market share of the ex
it the small
change had fallen to an all-time low (0.6 percent), making
est exchange for equities.
The volume of trading in equity options
Equity and Index Options.
on the PHLX was relatively stable from 1983 to 1989, despite the 1985
entry of the NYSE into the equity options market
(see Figure 5). The
NYSE was simply too late. It could not use its dominance
of exchange
based equity trading to gain more than a tiny toehold in the options
market. When
the NYSE entered the market, other exchanges were al
ready trading the most desirable options, and dual trading of options
67Securities
12 June 2000,1.
Week,
68
Other regional exchanges, most notably the Cincinnati
ness relationships
with ECNs to bring trading orders to their
pelago took over the equity trading floor of the Pacific Stock
the privileges
of an exchange. Financial
Times, 3 Apr. 2002,

Stock Exchange,
floors. In 2002,
Exchange,
4.

also used busi
the ECN Archil
effectively gaining all
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on exchange-traded
stocks was
that
NYSE
the
could
trade
way
was to participate
in the SEC's
trading
began to allow multiple

not permitted.
Prior to 1990, the only
an option on an exchange-listed
stock
Even
the
SEC
after
when
1993,
lottery.
for all stock options, the NYSE, like the
other exchanges,
chose not to trade options that had been allocated to
other exchanges
through the lottery. After more than a decade of fight
to
in 1997 the
build
its
under such restrictions,
ing
options business
NYSE gave up, shutting down its options trading floor.
a
The PHLX, along with other options
exchanges,
experienced
in
This
is
the
volume
of
between
and
1990
1992.
options trading
slump
to the end of the corporate takeover era associ
attributed
commonly
ated with the failure during the 1990s of Drexel Burnham and the cre
In the late 1980s,
ation of more effective corporate takeover defenses.69
a substantial
in options came from individuals
share of the business
and institutions
speculating on possible takeover targets.
The volume of options trading on the exchanges picked up in 1992,
in very little of this growth. The PHLX lost
but the PHLX participated
in
market
share
1989 and
equity option trades between
significant
was
as
to
PHLX
the
did
Much
of
this
decline
due
bad
1995.
luck,
simply
to trade some of the equity options that experienced
not happen
the
highest volume of trading in this period.
The luck of the PHLX turned around in the mid-1990s.
Beginning
in 1996, there was a general boom in equity option trading, much of
or hedging
in the stocks of high-flying
which represented
speculation
these
firms were
Since
of
many
relatively
technology
companies.
were
not
AMEX
CBOE
the
and
the
young,
generally trading options on
their stocks before the PHLX entered options trading. Thus, the PHLX
share of the option contracts on the stocks of these firms was almost
to that of any other exchange. When
the boom began, the
equivalent
to participate.
Between
PHLX was well positioned
1996 and 1998, the
PHLX saw rapid growth in trading on its equity options floor (see Fig
ure 5). In fact, the explosive volume
for the
led to serious problems
since
its
and
trade routing, executing,
PHLX,
technologies
reporting
were antiquated
and could not keep up with the order flow in its most
active options.70 This situation hurt the reputation of the exchange and
as reflected in the price of seats
cost it potential business. Nevertheless,
were
to trade equity options, these
boom times. The highest price paid
for a seat to trade equity options on the PHLX in 1993 was $20,000.
By
1998, itwas $305,ooo.71
69
26 Sept. 1990, E10.
Philadelphia
Inquirer,
70Wall Street
27 Apr. 1999, B30
Journal,
71Data
to the author by the PHLX.
provided
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PHLX introduced
in 1983.
options
trading in sector-index
on
PHLX
to
broad
the
also
trade
afterward,
began
options
Shortly
interest in the
indices. At first there was only modest
equity-market
PHLX's index options. But order flow for index options grew very rap
in the PHLX's sector-index
1992 and 1999. Trading
op
idly between
tions was particularly
strong. As the PHLX reported, "Three of the Ex
are by a significant margin
the most
change's [sector index options]...
of their type in the securities industry."72
actively traded instruments
Although
equity options were a major success for the PHLX from
1984 through 1999, the exchange could never be sure that this success
ex
would
last. During
the 1980s, the PHLX and the other options
a
in the trading of many of their most ac
changes had
legal monopoly
tive options. The SEC had created this situation because of its concern
The

that multiple
among unlinked
trading of identical option contracts
to public investors.
markets would be detrimental
to create a linkage system
The SEC pressed the options exchanges
it allocated exclusive
trading rights via a lot
during the period when
failed to create such a system, even
tery. But the options exchanges
after a decade of discussions.73
the SEC decided to end the
Frustrated,
that the exchanges
monopolies
enjoyed in option contracts while con
to create a linkage system. The SEC took
tinuing to push the exchanges
an incremental
In
that the right to trade
1985, it announced
approach.
options on OTC stocks would not be allocated through a lottery. These
In January 1990, the
options could be traded on multiple
exchanges.
SEC ended its lottery system for allocating options on exchange-listed
stocks. The SEC ruled that henceforth
that an ex
any new options
on
to
trade
could
also
be
traded
another
change began
exchange. These
a
in
had
In
modest
effect.
1992, only 111 of
changes
policy
only
August
on
more
one
traded
than
1,000 equity options
exchange.74 At the close
of 1992, the PHLX traded 228 equity options. Only 31 of these were
In November
traded on other exchanges.75
1992, the SEC began to lift
exclusive
for
the
500 equity options
trading privileges
approximately
allocated through the lottery system prior to 1990. It did so in stages,
all re
starting with the least actively traded options. By the mid-1990s,
strictions on multiple
had
the
been
but
still
lifted,
trading
exchanges
chose not to trade options that had been allocated
to other exchanges
under the lottery system. In mid-1999,
about 60 percent of equity op
tions still traded on only one exchange, and these included almost all of

72
Stock Exchange, Annual Report,
Philadelphia
73Wall Street
6 Oct. 1999, C20.
Journal,
74Investment
Dealers Digest,
17 Aug. 1992,14.
75
Stock Exchange, Annual Report,
Philadelphia

1994.

1992.
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active options.76 The PHLX, for example, was the only ex
to
trade options in Dell Computers
prior to late 1999. This was
change
an extremely active option, as alone it accounted
for 30 to 50 percent of
the volume in equity options on the PHLX during much of 1999.
Despite the strong volume of order flow to the PHLX options floor
about the continu
in early 1999, many people were highly pessimistic
soon
a
in
of
their worries
number
health
of
this
business.
And,
fact,
ing
in
materialized.
Several large securities firms, for example, announced
an
were
in
the
of
that
creation
all-electronic
op
1998
investing
they
to be known as the International
Securities Exchange
tions exchange,
that this exchange would
(ISE). The backers of the ISE also announced
In other words,
it
traded on other exchanges.
trade option contracts
the most

planned
many

to break

active

the monopolies

options

that the exchanges

had enjoyed with

contracts.

A second threat was the escalating pressure
that the SEC and the
U.S. Justice Department were applying to induce the options exchanges
to trade the other exchanges'
active options. By the late 1990s, the re
to compete for other exchanges'
luctance of the options exchanges
op
to charge that
tion contracts
led the SEC and the Justice Department
there

was

a "gentlemen's

agreement"

among

the

exchanges

not

to com

pete. Both agencies filed suit. The exchanges denied the charge, but in
as part
to improve self-regulation
2000 they agreed to spend millions
and the SEC. The PHLX, in
of a settlement with the Justice Department
to spend $8 million.
The PHLX also paid $2.8
committed
particular,
it had been
in 2000 to settle a class-action
million
lawsuit, in which
of increasing option spreads by squelching
competition.
By late 1999, litigation threats from the SEC and the Justice De
partment and the threat by the ISE to trade other exchanges' most ac
tive option contracts finally achieved the result that the SEC desired. In
agree
August 1999 the CBOE and AMEX broke the alleged gentlemen's
ment when they began to trade options in Dell Computers.
They imme
diately attracted a significant share of the Dell order flow away from the
the PHLX retaliated by initiating trading in
PHLX. Not surprisingly,
several of the most actively traded option contracts on the CBOE and
accused

AMEX.77
news
Option traders on the floor of the PHLX did have some good
the computerized
in 1999. As noted earlier, in the mid-1990s
trading
76Financial
Times, 19 Aug. 1999, 28.
the lack of an in
77New York Times, 24 Aug. 1999, C3. Multiple
listing occurred despite
the
Levitt
Arthur
SEC
In
chairman
October
termarket
1999,
reprimanded
system.
linkage
that they link
for failing to comply with his request (made in February)
exchanges
options
He gave them ninety days to come up with a plan for doing so, and they did.
their markets.
2001 and 2003.
The plan was phased in between
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and could
systems of the PHLX, especially for options, were antiquated
not handle especially high volumes of trading activity. Gaining access
to better trading technology
had been much
of the impetus for the
were un
those discussions
of the late 1990s. While
merger discussions
internal
derway, the PHLX began a costly but intentionally
low-profile
effort to improve its systems. In early 1999, almost at the same time as
it announced
that merger plans with the AMEX were no longer under
new computerized
it unveiled
consideration,
trading systems.78 The
The trading tech
systems were widely recognized to be state-of-the-art.
nology of the PHLX ceased to be an issue.
Over the course of 2000, the four major options exchanges
(CBOE,
added
AMEX, PHLX, and Pacific Stock Exchange
[PSE]) increasingly
that were most
active on other ex
trading in the option contracts
became even more heated when the new, all
changes. This competition
ISE options exchange opened for business
in May 2000 and
electronic
to immediately
lived up to its promise
begin trading the option con
tracts

active

on

other

exchanges.

Many people had argued that multiple
trading of options contracts
to the PHLX, since it had a relatively
might be particularly
damaging
small market
share and depended heavily on a small number of active
earlier efforts by
options contracts. These worries had partly motivated
the PHLX to merge with another exchange. Contrary to these concerns,
the move to multiple
the PHLX within the near term,
trading benefited
it.When
the CBOE and
partly because of the way the PHLX managed
the AMEX began to trade the Dell options that were the backbone
of
the PHLX in the late 1990s, the PHLX immediately
retaliated by per
mitting several of its specialists to begin trading some of the options that
were most active on the other exchanges. After that, however, it proceeded
at a more deliberate pace. The exchange would announce plans to trade
an option contract that was active on another exchange. But rather than
to one of the firms already active on
the specialist position
allocating
the PHLX, it would offer it to a large specialist operation
that had not
on
PHLX.
In
traded
the
PHLX
this
the
used
the oppor
way,
previously
new
to
trade
contracts
to
desirable
entice
the
tunity
options
largest and
best capitalized
specialist firms to become active on the PHLX.79 Since
such firms could attract orders based on their reputations
and capital,
this tactic augmented
the volume of trading on the options floor.
78Wall Street
27 Apr. 1999, B30.
Journal,
79The PHLX also
or
encouraged
specialist firms that were not able to attract significant
der flow to transfer their specialist positions
to other firms that might be able to attract more
It did this by levying a fee on all specialist firms. The fee was based on the assump
business.
tion that the firms have 10 percent of the aggregate
order flow in their op
exchange-traded
tion contacts.
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As the exchanges
for each other's order flows, it is per
competed
haps not surprising that the specialists on the various exchanges began
to pay for order flow.80 In July 2000, the CBOE escalated this competi
a system that effectively
tion by instituting
taxed all specialists
and
to raise funds for order-flow payments. The PHLX an
market makers
nounced
that it opposed
this exchange-sponsored
system of payment
for order flow. But it also made clear that it would not sit on the side
lines while others took its business.
In August 2000, the PHLX insti
tuted a system similar to that of the CBOE, but attached even higher
fees to its specialists
and market makers
and required higher order
flow payments. This policy, along with the increasing presence of large
specialist firms trading on the PHLX, helped feed a boom in PHLX or
der flow in late 2000 and early 2001.81
a record volume
the PHLX handled
of equity option
Although
trades in 2000, it had reason to be concerned about the future. Compe
tition among specialists
trading the same option contracts on different
as well as the shift to decimal pricing for equities, had nar
exchanges,
rowed spreads between
bid and offer prices.82 This, along with pay
ments
for order flow, made
it more
than ever to sustain a
important
on the exchange.
In
high volume of trading to support market-makers
in the all-electronic
the PHLX faced a new competitor
ISE.
addition,
Times were good on the option floor in 2000, but there was little room
for

complacency.

to promote
As the PHLX worked
its fledgling
Currency Options.
in 1983, large commercial
and investment
currency options market
banks increasingly
currency option con
began to write tailor-made
were
tracts for their corporate customers who
looking for better ways to
risks.83 The banks hedged their own net risk expo
hedge exchange-rate
sures by taking appropriate positions
in the spot market or the futures
market,
by trading currency options with each other in a developing
the banks
OTC market,
and by trading options on the PHLX.84 When
traded on the PHLX, their orders were generally far larger than the spe
therefore
cialists and market makers
could handle. The banks would
use a broker to find another institution, generally another bank, willing
to take the other

side of the trade. Once

two parties

agreed

to the terms

80
Laura Johnson,
for Order Flow' Seeps into Options Markets," Wall Street
"'Payment
Letter, 25 Oct. 1999,1-2.
81
21 Jan. 2001, El.
Philadelphia
Inquirer,
82
SEC chairman Levitt reported, "In four of the five actively traded options we examined,
22 and 44 percent since these options went from single
effective spreads have fallen between
Dynamic
listings." Arthur Levitt, "The Future of Our Markets:
trading to multiple
exchange
Law Review
(Winter 2000): 8.
Markets, Timeless
Principles," Columbia Business
83American
24 Jan. 1984,1.
Banker,
84
Ibid., 17 Jan. 1985,16.
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1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Figure
PHLX.

6. PHLX

volume

of currency

option

contracts

traded.

Source:

annual

reports

of the

it on the floor of the exchange. Market
interfere with these block trades. This
to handle large trades smoothly,
and it
practice enabled the exchange
to the rapid growth in trading volume between
contributed
1983 and
of the trade, they would execute
on the floor would not

makers

1987 (see Figure
By mid-1984,
trading

center

6).
itwas

for what

clear that the PHLX had become
could

become

a very

large

market.

the dominant
Financial

of

at large, internationally
active firms who never knew that Phila
were
now acutely aware of its presence.85
a
had
stock
delphia
exchange
The success that the PHLX was having with currency options was not
lost on other exchanges,
several of which also began to trade them. The
ficers

in
Chicago Board Options Exchange
began to trade currency options
two
PHLX
it
after
the
initiated
the
But
market.
years
1985,
September
could never overcome
and
first-mover
few
Philadelphia's
advantage,
see any reason to divert order flow from the PHLX.86 In
the
CBOE withdrew
from the business.87
August 1987,
Much of the order flow for currency options came from institutions
traders

could

85Financial
2 Oct. 1984,113.
Times of London,
86
Journal
3 Aug. 1987, 7B.
of Commerce,
87When
the CBOE stopped
its president
remarked,
trading currency options,
is the most
keeps proving that the first one there (in the market)
likely to succeed."
Tribune, 3 Aug. 1987, B7.
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in Europe, especially London.88 Not surprisingly, the European exchanges
resented the domination
of the business by an American
In
exchange.
London
Stock
the
the
and
London
International
mid-1985,
Exchange
Financial Futures and Options Exchange
(LIFFE) started to trade cur
the
French
futures
the March?
?
rency options.89 Similarly,
exchange,
Terme International
de France (MATIF), started trading currency op
tions in early 1994.90 But none of these competitors were able to dis
of the PHLX in exchange-traded
currency options.
place the dominance
After several years of rapid growth, the volume of trades on the
PHLX leveled off between 1987 and 1990 (see Figure 6). This was prima
rily due to the growth of the OTC market and the creation of exchange
rate bands for the European
to the European
currencies
that belonged
relative to
System. The reduced volatility of these currencies
Monetary
each other reduced the demand to hedge currency risks and limited op
for speculation. Nevertheless,
this was a halcyon era for many
portunities
on
traders
the
who
PHLX,
currency options
reaped substantial profits
on the floor of the exchange that
from market-making
and speculating
in trading volume resumed with
dominated
currency options. Growth
the turmoil among European
exchange rates in the early 1990s.91
After the peak in 1993, the volume of trading in currency options
on the PHLX started a precipitous
decline. By 2000,
trading volume
was so low as to be an insignificant part of the business of the exchange.
This decline was mainly
caused by the continued
growth of the OTC
to
in
the OTC market,
market. Many
corporations
hedge
preferred
since banks would tailor contracts to their specific needs.92 In addition,
the major international banks that had provided much of the order flow
to the PHLX began to deal exclusively
in the OTC market. By the early
and it had numerous very well
1990s, this market was well developed,
in the mid-1980s,
capitalized market makers. As the market developed
the option contracts that banks traded among each other to hedge their
net exposures became somewhat standardized, adding to their liquidity.93
A study issued by the International Monetary
Fund reported as follows:
OTC market
of an extensive and sophisticated
The development
structure in the 1980s and 1990s with many of the world's largest
financial institutions serving as market makers has greatly enhanced
88
Nicholas

in for
of the PHLX, stated, "60% of our volume
then the president
Giordano,
and traders." New York Times,
13 May
options comes from overseas hedgers
eign exchange
1985, D5.
89Financial
Times, 5 Aug. 1985,15.
90
Ibid., 28 July 1994, 25.
91
18 Sept. 1992, A16.
Philadelphia
Inquirer,
92 Investment
customized
Dealers Digest,
7 Sept. 1992, 5. In 1994, the PHLX introduced
in an effort to compete with the OTC, but these never gained
contracts
currency
options
share from the banks.
much market
93Financial
Times, 11 Dec. 1985, III6.
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the liquidity of OTC derivatives markets. This, in turn, has lowered
the cost of participation
and supported the expansion of the mar
ket. Measured by notional principal, OTC derivative markets have
grown to roughly nine times the size of those for exchange-traded
derivatives...

,94

close observer of the PHLX market added another reason for
to the OTC market by banks and other large institu
the shift in business
tions.95 He explained that as the currency options floor of the exchange
on the floor began to behave more aggressively,
grew, market makers
on
in large trades that had been negotiated
off
insisting
participating
the large orders and frus
the floor of the exchange. This fragmented
that were trading them through the PHLX. Many
trated the institutions
One

responded

by shifting

all their trades

to the OTC market.96

Conclusion
This account of the evolution of the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange
from the 1950s through 2000 takes an important step toward correct
in securi
ing the general neglect of the role of the regional exchanges
In addition,
itmakes two points. First, as iswidely recog
ties markets.
for trading to flow to the market with the
nized, there is a tendency
the history of the PHLX provides
substantial
liquidity. While
it also illustrates that other factors have
for this proposition,
reg
shaped order flow to securities markets. These include government
across
limita
differentiated
ulations,
markets,
trading technologies
tions on access to leading exchanges,
and, possibly, collusive behavior.
Second, the evolution of the PHLX illustrates how one small securities
exchange could adapt to survive in an industry subject to profound reg
in this study,
shocks. In each decade examined
ulatory and competitive
the PHLX's main business was very different from what it had been in
the preceding decade. In the 1950s, the PHLX was a small equities ex
from regional brokerage firms
change whose order flow came mainly
that were not members
of the NYSE. By the 1990s, the PHLX was trading
equity and currency options, and its equity floor was highly automated,
greatest
support

mainly

serving discount

brokerage

94
et al., Modern
Garry J. Schinasi
Banking
and its Implications
of Global Finance

mation

firms

throughout

and OTC Derivates
for

Systemic

Risk,

the country.

Markets:
The Transfor
Occasional
Paper #203.

D.C., 2000),
64.
(Washington,
95Author's
interview with Arnold Staloff, 17 Sept. 2002.
96 In late
the fragmentation
of large currency
1993, the PHLX tried to prevent
trades by stating that orders of more than one thousand
contracts
could be required
cute at a single price. Securities Week,
for the PHLX,
15 Nov. 1993, 5. Unfortunately
time most block traders had already shifted to the OTC market or were planning
to do
to return to the PHLX.
thus were not willing
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Appendix

Table

1

Market Shares of Dollar Volume of Equity Trades by Exchange
Total $
Volume

Year

(in millions)

NYSE

AMEX

CHX

PSE"

PHLX"

BSE

CSE

1950

21,808

85.91

6.85

2.35

2.19

1.03

1.12

0.11

1955

38,039

86.31

6.98

2.44

1.90

1.03

0.78

0.09

1960

45,310

83.80

9.35

2.72

1.94

1.03

0.60

0.07

1965

89,549

81.78

9.91

3.44

2.43

1.12

0.42

0.08

1970

131,708

78.44

11.11

3.76

3.81

1.99

0.67

0.30

1975

157,257

85.20

3.67

4.64

3.26

1.73

1.19

0.17

1980

476,501

83.53

7.33

4.33

2.27

1.61

0.52

0.40

1985

1,200,128

85.25

2.23

6.59

3.06

1.49

1.20

0.18

1990

1,616,798

86.15

2.33

4.58

2.77

1.79

1.63

0.74

1995

3,507,991

87.71

2.10

3.26

2.24

1.27

1.43

1.99

2000

13,691,342

81.93

5.53

7.58

1.19

0.62

1.87

1.26

aThe market
shares of the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange
and the Pacific Stock Exchange
include the shares of the exchanges
into them through mergers.
that were
incorporated
Source:
SEC annual reports.
Abbreviations:
Stock Exchange;
AMEX, American
NYSE, New York Stock Exchange;
Stock Exchange;
Stock
PSE, Pacific Stock Exchange;
CHX, Chicago
PHLX, Philadelphia
Stock Exchange;
CSE: Cincinnati
Stock Exchange;
BSE, Boston
CBOE, Chi
Exchange;
cago Board Options
Exchange.
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2

Market Share of Equity Option Sales by Exchange*1

Year
1977
1978

1990

1996
1997
1999

Total $ Volume
of Equity
Options Traded

(inmillions)
1976
11,734
10,899
18,953
1979
23,158
1980
45,873
1981
41,423
1982
53,660
1983
59,599
1984
33,822
1985
29,544
1986
40,054
1987
53,123
1988
27,164
1989
40,423
27,219
1991
27,104
1992
26,586
1993
33,779
1994
35,883
1995
50,803
67,862
104,535
1998
140,261
260,294
2000
481,440

AMEX

NYSE

(96)
13 77
19
17 43 69
19 43 72
45 60
26
46 61
27
59 54
33
58 60
27
69 60
25
26
81055
28
99 49
32
31
33
27
30
34
35
34
29
29
33
33
32
28
28

(96)

PSE

PHLX

(96)
(96) (96)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
010 53
8
1
11149
9
21011
44
21112
48
2 10
12
46
11342
9
21242
9
11245
8
11447
8
11944
7
1 44
15
7
17
0 40
9
16
0 11
41
16
048
8
0 15
17
40

a
Includes
stocks,
rights, and warrants.
Source:
SEC annual reports.
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